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The paper uses the recently available data on growth rates, 
democracy, protectionism, and wars over the period 1820 
to  2000  to  look  at  the  determinants  of  economic  growth 
o v e r  t h e  l o n g - t e r m .   I t  i s  m o t i v a t e d  b y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
questions: what is the effect of democracy on growth, was 
colonialism  economically  bad  for  colonies,  does 
protectionism affect growth negatively, what is the effect 
o f  w a r s ?  W e  f i n d  t h a t  o w n  d e m o c r a c y  h a s  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  
p o s i t i v e  i m p a c t  o n  g r o w t h  w h i c h  i n c r e a s e s  a s   c o u n t r y ’ s  
income goes up. (Overall level of democracy in the world 
h o w e v e r  h a s  n o  e f f e c t  o n  g r o w t h . )   T h e  e f f e c t  o f  
colonialism  is  not  statistically  significant.  Lower  average 
l e v e l  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  i n  t h e  w o r l d  h e l p s  g r o w t h .  W a r s ,  
whether  civil  or  between  the  states,  are  strongly 
detrimental to economic growth. 
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1.  The objective 
 
 
The paper has three objectives. First, to study the empirical 
relationship between economic growth and political variables, in particular 
democracy, over the entire period of what may called “the modern world” 
covering broadly the period from the end of Napoleonic wars in Europe 
until after the fall of  the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the USSR.  
 
Second, to look at the possible effects of colonization (and its 
reverse, decolonization) on both the colonies and the empires. Here we 
ask a question that was asked by many, namely did colonialism hamper 
faster development of the conquered countries and was imperialism 
beneficent for the metropolises? 
 
Third, we look at level of protectionism in the world (average tariff 
rate)  and its possible impact on growth over the long run.  
 
The first two topics have been extensively researched and 
discussed. This was however done for a much shorter period of time (for 
example, the discussion of the relationship between growth rates and 
democracy was typically limited to the post- World War II period), or for 
only a few selected countries (e.g. studies of British colonial impact on 
Indian economic development). What distinguishes this work is that these 
questions are considered for the first time in a single framework (all of 
them simultaneously) and, most importantly, for a period of almost two 
centuries.  
  3  
This paper is made possible by the remarkable recent progress in 
the availability of historic data series for economic, demographic, and 
political variables. Section 3 discusses at some length these new data 
sources. Section 2 reviews briefly some of the existing literature on the 
three topics mentioned above. Since the discussion of these topics has 
been conducted since the very inception of the modern world—that is, for 
almost two hundred years—we cannot but be very selective. The review 
is therefore simply meant to provide a few pointers to the reader, or to 
put the analysis which follows in context rather than to be exhaustive and 
do justice to the volumes that have been written on these issues. Section 
4 presents the core part of the paper: the empirical investigation of these 
relationship for the period 1820-2000. Section 5  presents tentative 
conclusions. 
 
2. Discussion of the issues: a selective review 
 
We are motivated by the following questions. 
 
1. In the last two centuries, have increases in democracy 
(holding countries constant) been associated with faster 
growth rates or not? Or more exactly, using long-term data, 
do we find that increases in democracy help growth? 
 
2. Did empires grow faster because they controlled colonies 
or not? And the related question, was growth of colonies 
slowed because they lacked political independence or,  
differently, have they been able to increase their growth rate 
in absolute terms or in relative terms (compared to the rest of 
the world) since decolonization?  
  4  
3. Are countries’ growth rates helped by a less protectionist 
world climate? In other words, if we have a choice between a 
world characterized by high tariff rates and another one 
characterized by lower tariff rates, will countries, on average, 
grow faster under one regime than another? 
 
 
We include also two subsidiary  questions: what was over this period the 
effect of Communism on economic growth (in addition to the effect that it 
might have had through the democracy variable), and what is the effect on 
economic growth of being involved in wars and civil conflicts? 
 
Democracy and growth. Consider first the relationship between 
democracy and economic growth. It has been extensively studied.  One of 
the key problems studies had to address is the endogeneity of the 
relationship. In other words, not only is democracy likely to affect the 
tempo of growth, but the reverse, higher income level, makes it easier for 
democracy to emerge, or in a different twist, more likely to stick once  it 
was achieved. 
2 Therefore, the coefficient on the impact of democracy on 
growth is likely to be biased. A further problem has been the inability to 
find variables that would be good instruments for democracy, in the sense 
that all variables that are likely to be associated with democracy are also 
likely to be correlated with the error term in the growth regression (that 
is, to affect growth outcomes themselves). Given these constraints, there 
was nevertheless a significant number of papers that dealt with the 
relationship.  
 
                                                 
2 The income-democracy relationship is often called the Lipset hypothesis. Przeworski 
(2004) argues against it: income does not bring along democracy. It is simply that 
democracy –if it emerges in a rich country—is more likely to stick there. Hence we are 
bound to observe the association between the two.   5  
In an influential paper Przeworski and Limongi (1993) reviewed 
some twenty empirical studies published to date and found that the 
evidence as to whether democracy or authoritarianism helps growth was, 
in a cross-sectional framework, almost exactly equally divided. As many 
studies ruled in favor or one as in favor of another—with a fair number 
reporting a tie. Moreover, Przeworski and Limongi (1993, p. 60) noted that 
the preponderance of evidence in favor of authoritarianism had somewhat 
waned in the more recent studies. They speculated that some of it might 
have been due to the difference in the samples and years and some to the 
differences in perception of success and hence fashions: autocratic, 
“developmentalist” regimes were widely believed to be doing better than 
democracies in the 1960s and 1970s, but the perception has since 
reversed. According to Przeworski and Limongi, even if we uncover some 
regularities in the relationship between growth and democracy, it is likely 
to be spurious.  It is the differences in the regime survival that explain the 
differences in growth outcomes that we observe. Authoritarian regimes 
are more likely to change (into democracies) if economic growth sputters. 
Hence the observed positive correlation between democracy and 
economic growth is likely to be due to the selection bias.  
 
Perotti’s (1996) extensive empirical paper investigates a number of 
connections between income distribution, political institutions and growth. 
The link between democracy and growth is twofold: a direct one, and an 
indirect one through the median voter hypothesis which implies that more 
unequal democracies would tend to engage in greater redistribution and 
thus to affect growth rate negatively. Democracy is defined as a 
dichotomous variable based on Judice and Taylor (1988) definition. The 
period covered is 1960-1985 and Perotti uses country averages over that  6  
period. 
3 Thus the analysis is clearly cross-sectional, rather limited in 
sample  size (one observation per country for each of the variables), and 
presented in levels only. Perotti (1996, p. 165) finds both effects of 
democracy to be statistically undistinguishable from nil.
4  
 
Barro has used democracy as an explanatory variable in his growth 
regressions from quite early on, starting at least with his 1991 paper. He 
too finds democracy and growth to be uncorrelated in a multivariable 
regression setting. In a more recent paper that is mostly concerned with 
the relationship between inequality, openness, and growth within a panel 
of countries, Barro (2000) uses democracy as a control. 
5 Not surprisingly, 
it comes out as statistically not significant (see p.12). The same result is 
reported by Levine and Renelt (1992, p. 950) in their  sensitivity analysis 
of growth regression. They conclude that democracy is not robustly 
correlated with growth.
6 
                                                 
3 For a critique of the type of data used in this approach (not limited to Perotti of course) 
see Milanovic (2000). 
 
4 Perotti (p. 164-5) does argue that within democracies (that is, when the sample is split 
in democracies and non-democracies), the median voter hypothesis holds. But obviously 
this issue concerns the validity of the median voter hypothesis,  not whether democracies 
have a different  growth experience than non-democracies. To investigate the latter, one 
needs a sample where both are represented.  
 
5 It is not exactly clear what the definition of democracy is. Barro (2000, p.111) 
cryptically mentions that it is “a subjective index of…(electoral rights).” A more detailed 
definition is promised to exist on the Websites whose URL are not given. An Internet 
search discovered the Barro-Lee education data set, and some old definitions of political 
variables but no definition of democracy. By analogy with other Barro’s work, however, 
one would guess that this is the Gastil index later taken over and updated annually by the 
Freedom House. 
 
6 The result is obtained from a single cross-section of some 100 countries  using 
averages between 1960 and 1989. The number of observations in the “early” literature is 
very small. Levine and Renalt’s (1992) influential sensitivity analysis is based on one 
hundred or fewer observations!  7  
 
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) take a more comprehensive view of 
the role of democracy. Since their empirical approach is probably the most 
complete it is worth explaining in somewhat greater detail. They argue  
that  democracy is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and as such unlikely to 
affect growth through a single channel and directly. Rather it should affect 
growth through a multitude of channels—that is, indirectly. Empirically, it 
requires a more complicated structure: first, one has to identify the 
determinants of growth, and second to see whether these determinants 
are in turn affected by democracy. Consequently, a system of 
simultaneous equations needs to be solved. Tavares and Wacziarg identify 
four operative (in the sense that they are statistically significant) 
channels: education, inequality, public expenditures and capital 
accumulation.  
 
In a usual cross-country level panel setting (65 industrial and 
developing countries over the period 1970-1989 using five-year 
averages), they provide two specifications: seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SURE) where the same set of exogenous regressors is 
supposed to affect different dependent variables (education, inequality 
etc.) which then in turn affect growth, and an IV-GLS approach where 
they instrument for endogenous variables.
7 
8 They create  their own 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 It is instructive to look at their exogenous variables: population, various geographical 
and semi-geographic variables (e.g. dummy for oil exporters), ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, political status of the country (independent, colony). 
 
8 The sample size should ideally be 260 (65 countries times 4 five-year periods) but is in 
reality much smaller (only 65) due to the lack of complete dataset for a number of 
variables. The fact that the system is extremely complex and requires a lot of 
instruments and controls does not help.   8  
binary democracy index based on Freedom House data. They find that 
growth is positively affected by education and capital accumulation which, 
in turn, are differently influenced  by democracy. The first is increased, 
the latter decreased. It thus quickly emerges that democracy is unlikely to 
have an unambiguous  effect on growth. In the same vein, they find that 
growth is positively affected by lower inequality and negatively by higher 
government spending. Yet again, democracy helps growth on the one hand 
by reducing inequality but hampers it by increasing government spending. 
These are the four statistically significant effects which we mentioned 
above: two positive, two negative. On balance they yield an overall  
negative effect of democracy on growth (mostly on account of lower 
capital accumulation).  
 
The results essentially carry-over in a fixed-effects framework 
although both the size and the significance of the coefficients are less, and 
in particular lower capital accumulation is no longer significantly 
associated with democracy. The outcome is that the total effect now is not 
statistically different from zero. Nevertheless, Tavares and Wacziarg tend 
to credit more the cross-sectional results and they conclude that 
democracy tends to be more responsive to the needs of the poorer 
sections of the population. This leads to increased education achievement 
and lower income inequality, but their positive effect on growth is more 
than offset by the slowdown in capital accumulation. They conclude that, 
based on the narrow economic grounds, it is difficult to make a case for a 
positive effect of democracy.  
 
One of the key critiques of  the studies that looked at the 
relationship between democracy and growth is that many of them are   9  
based on cross-sectional data only where most of the identification (or 
even all of it)  comes from between-country differences. Since 
democracy, growth and a number of other relevant variables may be 
jointly determined, the results are likely to suffer from endogeneity and 
the approach fails  to answer the question of how democratization affects 
growth performance of a given country.  To address this point, Rodrik and 
Wacziarg (2004) look at the instances of significant democratizations. 
9 A 
significant democratization is defined as an increase of at least 3 points in 
the polity2 variable. Polity2 variable (from Polity IV database) is defined 
as level of democracy (ranging between 0 and 10) minus level of 
autocracy (ranging also from 0 to 10). The variable thus takes values 
between – 10 (most autocratic regime) to +10 (most democratic).  Rodrik 
and Wacziarg distinguish between the new democracies (countries within 
the first five years after a significant democratization) and established 
democracies (countries that have sustained significant democratization for 
more than five years). In a two-way fixed effects models that controls 
both for country- and time-effects, they find that the coefficient on new 
democracies is positive and significant and estimate the effect on per 
capita rate of growth to be 0.87 percent p.a. (all regressions are estimated 
annually). Moreover, they find that the effect is stronger for new 
democracies while it is statistically not different from zero for more 
established democracies. The effect carries through even when 
investigated in smaller samples, e.g. on the sample or low income or 
African countries alone. Therefore Rodrik and Wacziarg conclude that 
                                                 
9 An earlier paper using the same approach and obtaining the same results  was that by 
Shen (2002).  
  10 
democratization—within a country—generally tends to have a positive 
impact on growth.  
 
Finally, Persson (2004) argues that the failure to uncover the effect 
of democracy on growth is due to the use of too blunt a measure of 
democracy—in almost all cases a simple binary measure. He believes that 
the type of democracy is more important and introduces a variable to 
distinguish parliamentary vs.  presidential and proportional vs. 
majoritarian political systems. In a panel setting (period 1960-2000 using 
Penn World Tables data for up to 140 countries) he finds that 
parliamentary and proportional systems outperform the other two.
10 
However these results are obtained when regressions are run across the 
sample of democracies only (the latter being defined as country/years 
with the positive value of polity2 variable) and do not address the 
difference between democracies and non-democracies.
11 
 
Colonialism and growth. On the subject of colonialism, and its 
economic benefits or costs, there is an inexhaustible literature. We would 
thus have to be extremely selective. There is, it seems, little doubt that 
the relations between colonies and metropolises were unequal and were 
structured, at least in principle,  to the benefit of the latter. Bairoch (1997, 
vol. 2: 665-669, 647-8) has termed this unequal deal the “colonial 
                                                 
10 The regressions are two-way fixed effects including year and country dummies.  The 
data are annual and contemporaneous. 
 
11 Persson’s approach, like the one of Tavares and Wacziarg, also relies on two steps. First, 
Persson investigates the effect of the type of democracy on two structural policies 
(approximated by openness, that is, trade/GDP ratio, and protection of property rights) 
and then the impact of these structural policies  on output per worker. The latter impact 
is elusive (see Persson,  2004, p. 18-19). 
  11 
contract.” It contained the following four elements: (i) colonies can import 
only products from the metropolis and tariff rates must be low, normally 
zero percent, (ii) colonial exports can be made to the metropolis only from 
which they could be reexported, (iii) production of manufactured goods 
that can compete with the products of the metropolis is banned, and (iv) 
transport between colony and metropolis is conducted only on metropolis’ 
ships. Economic policy of the colonies (to the extent that there was any 
independent economic policy) was therefore entirely subjugated to the 
interests of the metropolis, the most important objective being to prevent 
industrial competition from the colony. According to Bairoch, the “colonial 
contract” was the main cause of non-transmission of industrial revolution 
outside Europe. 
 
In addition, other forms of exploitation were used, as illustrated by 
the “cultivation system” in Indonesia where exorbitant land taxes had to 
be defrayed by what was effectively a tribute: forced deliveries of crops, 
or forced labor (see Maddison, 2001, p. 86). As Maddison mentions,  
monopoly was another route to exploitation. Thus, all Indonesia’s export 
trade was conducted using the ships owned by the Dutch King. Hochschild 
(1999) compared  similar forced labor techniques introduced by Belgians 
in the Congo to the Gulag system in the Soviet Union, Both of course 
entailed  huge human losses. The situation was not too different in other 
colonies or with other colonial powers, although there were obviously 
differences in the level of exploitation across time and place.  Maddison 
(2001) has used the concept of “colonial drain”, defined as the trade 
surplus run by the colony in  its relationship with the metropolis, as an 
indicator of the unpaid flow of resources to the advantage of the 
metropolis. (The concept itself assumes  that the surplus does not lead to  12 
any offsetting financial benefit to the colony—that is, the colony does not 
gain a financial claim on the metropolis).  Maddison’s (2001, p. 87) 
estimates suggest an extremely high drain ranging between 7 and 10 
percent of Indonesia GDI between 1868 and 1930. This may be considered 
an upper limit since Dutch colonialism was often thought to have been the 
most “efficient’ in these terms. Similar calculations (Maddison, 2001, p. 
87) show the drain from India to Great Britain over the same period to 
have averaged about 1 percent of GDI. 
12 But whatever the amount, the 
important thing for us here is to see that there are both theoretical 
reasons and indeed empirical evidence that colonialism was associated 
with either outright exploitation of colonies or economic policies that 
disregarded colonies’ interests. 
13 
 
This last point has been strongly argued by Bairoch (1997). But 
while Bairoch views colonialism as having been economically detrimental  
to the colonies, he does not consider the resource transfers to have been 
the chief culprit. The cause, according to Bairoch, was that the relations 
between the two sides were structured to be inimical to the 
industrialization of the (future) Third World. The main reason was the 
need of the rich world to ensure easy markets for its industrial products. 
                                                 
12 The issue is still alive; see for example a recent paper by Hatekar and Donge (2005) 
who argue that the structural break in India’ s growth occurred in 1950-52, just after 
independence not, as some authors have suggested, with economic liberalization in 1980-
81. 
 
13 Another advantage of having colonies—although this one not linked to unequal trade—
was that the expansion of food production in colonies reduced the pressure on European 
rents and also permitted lower wages (since wage goods were cheaper than they would 
have been otherwise). In a recent econometric simulation of the role of (what is called) 
“ ghost acreages”  van Zanden (2005, p.27) estimates that their contribution at the peak 
might have amounted to as much as 10 percent of Dutch GDI.  
 
  13 
To do so the metropolises needed to nip in the bud any attempt at local 
competition. Bairoch argues that it was not accidental that the only non-
Western 19th century attempts at industrialization, whether ultimately 
successful or failed, were started in the countries that were independent: 
Mohammed Ali’s Egypt, Japan in the Meiji era, and King Radama’s 
Madagascar. But while, according to Bairoch, colonialism was responsible 
for the failure of the rest of the world to benefit from technological 
revolution, the rest of the world was only of marginal importance for the 
West’s 19
th century success. Bairoch (1989) illustrates this by showing 
that both in exports and imports, the role of trade with Asia, Africa and 
Latin America remained marginal for the key West European nations. 
West’s growth was therefore self-propelled, and the failure of the Rest 
was not the cause of West’s success.  
 
The view that colonialism was economically harmful to colonies 
while not beneficial to the West, or not an explanation for its take-off,  
will be called the Bairoch hypothesis.
14 The hypothesis can be readily 
interpreted in econometric terms. We would expect to find colonialism to 
have been associated with negative effects on the growth of colonies, and 
with no effect on the growth of the metropolises. In contrast, those like 
Samir Amin (see Amin, 1970, p. 152) or William McNeill (1982) who hold 
the view that colonialism was beneficent to the metropolises would argue 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
14 “ …I hasten to insist on the fact that if colonialism did not play an important role in 
explaining why ‘ we [the West] became rich’ , it played a crucial role in explaining why 
‘ they [the Third World] remained poor’  and even why, at a certain stage of history, 
‘ they became poorer.’  And among the many causes of such an evolution is what I call 
compulsory economic liberalism of the future Third World economies.”  (Bairoch, 1989, 
p. 238).  
  14 
that we should expect to find the opposite signs in the growth regressions 
for the two sets of countries: negative for the colonies, positive for the 
empires.
15 A final possibility is the one hinted by Hobson, namely that 
colonialism was economically harmful both to the rulers and to the ruled.
16 
In that case, the sign in the regressions should be negative both for 
colonies and empires. For simplicity, we can call it the Hobson hypothesis.   
 
Colonialism was not much used in empirical work on growth except 
in a rather superficial way where dummy variables are assigned to various 
countries depending on whether they were colonies, and if so whose 
colonies. This was done to instrument institutions which in turn are 
supposed to affect growth (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), 
or to use it as an indicator of the legal origin a country “inherited” which 
is supposed to affect future governance or growth (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). But the effect of colonialism on the 
performance of countries while they were colonies was not studied. 
Tavares and Wacziarg in their already quoted paper use two dummy 
                                                 
15 “ Frontier expansion [of the Western powers] in turn sustained an expanding trade 
network, enhanced taxable wealth in Europe, and made support of the armed 
establishments less onerous than would otherwise have been the case. Europe, in short, 
launched itself on a self-sustaining cycle in which its military organization sustained, and 
was sustained by, economic and political expansion at the expense [my emphasis] of 
other peoples and polities of the earth (McNeill, 1982, p. 143, quoted in Arrighi 1991, 
p.128). 
 
16 This is a major simplification of Hobson’ s (1903) view. He distinguished between 
imperialism (which implied a political power of the metropolis over a restive domestic 
population) and colonialism which meant population transfer from the metropolis to a 
broadly empty settlement abroad. Imperialism was, Hobson argued, detrimental to the 
economic interests of  workers in metropolises, but not necessarily to the interests of 
capital-owners. Thus, it is unclear whether on balance imperialism was, according to 
Hobson,  bad for the overall income of the metropolis. But colonialism (in Hobson’ s 
sense) was not a drain on resources  since all such countries (Canada, Australia) were 
fully self-governing and de facto independent. 
  15 
variables reflecting colonial experience of the countries (one dummy for 
whether country has even been a colony, another for whether its 
independence was achieved after 1945). Neither variable is statistically 
significant in their various formulations (see p. 1369).   
 
Protectionism and growth. The relationship between protectionism 
and growth has also been subject to a lot of debate. This was, of course, 
done for the levels of protection in a given country and its rate of growth. 
Here, however, we have something else in  mind: we do not use individual 
countries’  tariff rates (which we do not have) and relate them to 
countries’ growth rates, but rather to the average world level of 
protection. This is a time-varying proxy for the overall pro-protectionist 
or pro-free trade stance in the most important countries, and by extension 
in the whole world. The relationship between this global variable and 
countries’ growth rates has not been, to my knowledge, investigated. 
 
3. The data and some descriptive statistics 
 
The paper uses, for the first time jointly, the three large and 
recently created databases: Angus Maddison’s (2004) series on growth 
and population, PolityIV data  on democracy, and Correlates of War (COW) 
project’s data on civil and international wars, and  countries’ status 
(independent or not). Conveniently, the three datasets cover practically 
the same period. Maddison’s series starts in 1820 and ends in 2001.
17 
PolityIV series begins in 1800 and ends in 2002. The COW dataset begins 
in 1816 and goes up to 1997. 
                                                 
17 Actually, Maddison’ s data start with year AD 1 but a much denser and more reliable 
series is available from 1820 onwards.   16 
 
Each of these three data sets is country- and time-variant. A 
country/year is our basic unit of observation. Since the data are such a 
key ingredient in this paper, and since their creation or compilation 
represents a massive undertaking that is changing our conception of both 
the present and the past, they need to be described with greater care than 
is usually allowed to such issues. 
 
Gross domestic income and democracy data. The Gross Domestic 
Income (GDI) per capita data are obtained from Maddison (2004) and 
include between 5 (in the years 1821-29) and 162 countries annually for 
the period 1820-2001. The coverage is gradually expanding throughout 
the 19
th century and from around 1880, the country coverage (measured 
by the share of world population) reaches more than 2/3. In some 
benchmark years like 1890, 1900, 1913, the coverage exceeds 95 
percent.  The average population coverage for the entire period is 73 
percent. The democracy data set comes from PolityIV (version 2002). 
Polity IV provides country scores on democracy, autocracy and a number 
of other political variables. The annual coverage  ranges from a minimum 
of 20 countries in the early 19
th century to 157 countries in 2002. The 
population coverage is in  all but a few years greater than 60 percent of 
world population and since the 1950s it is between 90 and 100 percent. 
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
18 In a few years when the coverage dips this is owing to the wars in China (as for 
example in 1860-61) when due to the unsettled political circumstances there is no Polity 
coding. 
  17 
The merging of the two data sets is more difficult than it might 
seem at first sight. This is because the approaches of Maddison and Polity 
IV differ in an important respect. Maddison takes, with a few exceptions, 
as his starting point the currently existing countries and tries to trace 
historical per capita income on the territory of the countries as they 
currently are. Thus, for example, Maddison’s data aim to present GDI per 
capita of the populations that were living on the current territory of 
Germany or Austria or Russia regardless of the fact that these countries 
might have been larger or smaller at given historical dates. PolityIV data 
sets takes the opposite, legalistic, approach. It considers as its unit of 
analysis a “polity” (country) that is a member of the inter-state system  at 
a given point in time and within its contemporaneous borders.
 19 This 
means that the information on the level of democracy in Germany in (say) 
1930 will pertain to all territories that were part of Germany then, 
including for example the territory that is today Poland or Russia. 
Maddison’s German data for 1930, will, on the contrary, refer only to the 
income produced within what is currently German territory.  More details 
regarding the merging of the two data sets is given in Annex 1.  
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the average world GDI per capita 
(expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) over the period 1820-2000 
and world Concept 2 inequality (that is, inequality between population-
                                                 
19 Being a member of the inter-state system is defined as being accepted as an 
independent entity either through membership of international organizations like League 
of Nations or United Nations or by being recognized as an independent entity by at least 
two major powers. The Polity definition of what is a member of the inter-state system  
stems from the Correlates of War project (see Singer and Small, 1994).  Only entities 
with population greater than half-million are included in either Polity or Correlates of 
War databases.  18 
weighted GDIs per capita). 
20 In both cases, the data are presented only 
for the years where at least 70 percent of contemporary world population 
is included. 
Figure 1. World average GDI per capita and 
international Concept 2 inequality, 1820-2000 
 
Note: Data only for the years where at least 70 percent of world population is included. 
World average per capita GDI expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars 
(left-hand y axis). International inequality is population-weighted Gini coefficient of 
countries’ GDIs per capita (right-hand y axis). Source: calculated from Maddison (2004).  
 
 
Over almost two centuries, the average per capita income has 
grown from about $PPP 700 in 1820 to a little over $PPP 6,000 in year 
2001. This yields a compounded rate of annual per capita growth of 1.2 
percent. We notice several dips along the exponentially rising curve in 
Figure 1, most notably during World War II and in 1990-91. The dashed 
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line shows international inequality obtained by calculating the Gini 
coefficients across all countries’ GDI per capita weighted by their 
populations. (This of course leaves out inequality due to within-national 
distributions, Adding the latter to the Concept  2 inequality would yield 
global inequality between world citizens.
21) Here we notice the period of 
global divergence from the middle of the 19
th century until around 1950. 
After that point, Concept 2 inequality is broadly stable at the level of Gini 
of 0.5.  Figure 1 thus presents the stylized picture of the two most 
important global economic trends during the last two hundred years: 
massive increase in output and significant increase in inequality which has 
however halted, but not reversed, during the last 50 years. 
 
Figure 2 shows PolityIV data on democracy. Democracy is defined 
by the PolityIV variable called polity2 which is equal to the score for 
democracy minus the score for autocracy. As already mentioned, it varies 
between –10 and +10.  
                                                 
21 For an estimate of Concept 3 (global inequality among citizens in the world) over the 
period 1820-1992 see Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002).   20 
 
Figure 2. World mean score for democracy and mean absolute deviation of 
democracy scores 1820-2000 
 
Source: variable Polity2 from the Polity IV database. Polity2 index ranges from –10 to 
+10. The world mean level of democracy is unweighted (each country in the sample 
counts the same). The deviation is the average absolute deviation from the mean. 
 
Figure 2 describes the evolution of democracy over the last two 
centuries. After a steady increase in the democracy score up to mid-
1920’s, the average world democracy score began an equally steady 
decline in the inter-war period and then another one as various 
Communist regimes and dictatorships in the newly independent countries 
came to power after the end of World War II. However the last twenty 
years have witnessed a major upswing in democracy so that its average 
level is now higher than at the previous peak in 1922. Variability in 
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1950’s but has  recently declined. In other words, country scores are now 
more similar than  they were 20 or 30 years ago.  
 
Data on colonies and wars. We also need to look at the role of 
colonialism and its obverse, imperialism. To do this we need the data on 
whether countries were independent or not. We use the data from 
Correlates of War (COW) project which gives years at which each country 
has jointed the “inter-state system.” Since our interest is in independence 
as a way to have a self-governing authority in charge of economic policy, 
we complement the COW definition by considering as independent also 
self-governing British colonies. They are Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa. 
22 Similar adjustments have been made for the countries 
that have either been independent throughout recent history (e.g. Japan, 
China, Thailand) although they have joined the inter-state system 
relatively late (respectively in 1860, 1860 and 1887). These countries are 
treated as independent throughout (that is, back to 1800). The same 
approach was also applied to the cases such as Haiti that became 
independent in 1805 but joined the inter-state system in 1859, and to a 
slew of Latin American countries that  achieved their independence in the 
early 1820’s but did not become members of the inter-state system until 
twenty or more years later. These and other adjustments to the COW 
database are spelled out in detail in Annex 1.  
 
                                                 
22 According to the official British definition of colonies (see Hobson, 1903, p. 23),  
colonies were of three kinds: “ (1) Crown colonies in which the Crown has the entire 
control of legislation…(2) colonies possessing representative institutions, but not 
responsible government…and (3) colonies possessing representative institutions and 
responsible government.”   Only the four entities listed above belonged to the latter kind.   22 
We have thirteen colonial powers (see Annex 1) and for each of 
them and for each year we calculate total population they controlled. This 
variable is called “empire.” The total number of people living in (say) 
British colonies gives an annual estimate of the Empire’s “pool of human 
resources” from  which it can draw, and which it can possibly exploit 
through unequal exchange, plunder, unequal treaties or simply policies 
which are not in the interest of the colonies. Since per capita income 
levels of colonies were similar, the number of people also serves as a 
good proxy for the total economic power  possessed by colonies and thus 
potentially free to be used by the metropolises. That this is not a trivial 
matter was amply illustrated by the importance of colonies as sources of 
raw materials and labor, and also by the fact (illustrated in Figure 3) that 
the share of world population living in colonies ranged between 30 and 40 
percent throughout the hundred year period ending in 1950. Figure 4 
shows the total colonial population controlled by the two largest empires. 
At its peak, British empire had about 500 million subjects (or 10 people 
for every person living in the metropolis). The French at their peak 
controlled about 90 million people in colonies, a ratio of 2-1 with respect 
to the metropolitan population.  
  23 
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Note: Calculated from Correlates of War project. For detailed explanations see Annex 1. 
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Another important variable is the presence of war. For this we also 
use Correlates of War project which provides the data on intra-state wars, 
inter-state wars and extra-state wars covering the period 1816-1997. 
Intra-state wars are civil wars or violent conflicts which take place within 
a single state. Inter-state wars are wars between two or more actors 
(states) belonging to the inter-state global system (e.g. the war between 
Prussia and France in 1870). Extra-state wars are wars between an 
acknowledged actor in the inter-state system (say, United Kingdom) and 
the people (colony) it is trying to conquer. The latter is not an actor in the 
inter-state system, hence a different appellation.
23 Participant countries in 
each of these wars are treated as countries at war for the years during 
which the war lasted. 
24  Figure 5 shows the average likelihood of being 
involved in the first two kinds of wars (intra- and inter-state). The 
average annual probability over the last 180 years was  6.6 percent with 
the peaks of some 20 percent during the two World Wars. During the 
heyday of Globalization I (1870-1914), frequency of these two types of 
wars (although not colonial wars) was  relatively small—under 5 percent. 
                                                 
23 Practically all extra-state wars are colonial wars or wars of national liberation. It is 
difficult at times to make an unambiguous distinction between intra-state wars (such as 
for example Ottoman Empire vs. Mehmet Ali in Egypt, or Mexico vs. the Yucatan Maya) 
and extra-state wars such the British-Ashanti wars or the French-Algerian war.  
 
24 Obviously, in intra-state wars although the sides may be many, only one country is 
coded as being at war. For the inter-state wars, at least two countries are coded as 
being at war. For extra-state wars only the country (participant) on whose soil the war 
was fought was coded as having been involved in a war.   25 
 
Figure 5.  Average annual frequency of wars, 1820-1997 
 Source: Calculations from the database Correlates of Wars. Note: Includes only intra-
state wars (civil wars) and wars between the states members of the international system. 
 
Data on protectionism. We next move to time-variant (but not 
country-variant) variables. One such variable available for the period of 
about two hundred years is world average level of protection. The data 
were calculated from Coatsworth and Williamson (2003) who provide 
regional unweighted averages of nominal tariff rates. There are six 
regions in their calculations: the core European countries (Germany, 
France and the UK), European periphery (ten countries), West European 
offshoots (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), Latin American countries 
(eight), Asian countries (ten including China and India), and the United 
States. Thus 35 country-data were used to create regional tariff averages. 
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average tariff rate along the same lines as Coatsworth and Williamson 
(2003) who did the (world-level) calculations for the period up to 1950. 
The results are shown in Figure 6. In addition, since Coatsworth-
Williamson data do not include Communist countries (China and Russia are 
included only for the period when they were not Communist), we augment 
the Coatsworth-Williamson data by assuming that the average tariff rates 
under Communism were 100 percent. This is of course an arbitrary 
although not unrealistic assumption since Communist countries were 
almost with no exception closed economies; although tariff rates did not 
play much of a role in trade,  protection was provided through a system of 
allocated foreign exchange and bilateral bargaining deals.  So protection 
was undoubtedly high.  27 
 
Figure 6. Estimated average level of tariff protection in the world,  
1865-2000 
 
Note: calculated from six regional averages given by Coatsworth and Williamson (2003) 
and then weighted by regional GDIs (in PPP dollars from Maddison, 2004). The data 
including Communist countries assume that Communist countries’ average tariff rate was 
100 percent. Data including Communist countries=solid line. 
 
 
Figure 6  shows two different patterns of protection depending on 
whether we include Communist-ruled countries or not. If we do not, then 
we notice a decrease in protection from an average of 15 percent in the 
19
th century to only 7 percent between 1900 and 1925. This was followed 
by a sharp reversal until the end of World War II when, with the creation 
of the European Economic Community and different GATT rounds, the 
average level of protection fell again to below 10 percent. However, if we 
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protection exceeded 20 percent until the early 1990s when it dropped 
following the collapse of the Communist system.  
 
Data on Communism. The years of Communist rule are considered 
as all the years when countries were characterized by (i) the monopoly of 
political power exercised by a Communist party, and (ii) predominantly 
state-owned and centralized economy. This of course makes most of 
Eastern European and Baltic countries Communist from around 1945-8 
(depending on the country) until 1990, the Soviet Union (with the 
exception of the Baltics and Moldova) plus Mongolia from the early1920 to 
1991, Cuba and Vietnam from respectively 1960 and 1976 to today. 
25  
Thus as Communist are considered all countries that were members of the 
CMEA plus Yugoslavia and Albania. 
 
A difficult decision concerns China. While China is still nominally a 
Communist country, the importance of non-state ownership in its economy 
has risen to a share where  the country cannot any longer be meaningfully 
considered Communist.  We have decided to treat China as non-
Communist from the first year when the state-owned share in the 
industrial value added dropped below 50 percent.
26 This is 1992. 
                                                 
25 Only a unified Vietnam appears in Maddison data. We thus include Vietnam only for the 
period after 1975.  
 
26 See Statistical yearbook of China 1996, p. 401. Agriculture has been mostly de facto 
private since the introduction of the “ responsibility system”  in 1978.  29 
4. Empirical analysis: what explains growth? 
 
Variables we use. In the empirical analysis of growth, we use three 
types of variables (see equation 1): those that are both time- and 
country-variant, those that are only time-variant (and thus the same 
across all countries), and those that are only country-variant (and thus the 
same across time).  
 
The first group of variables includes both continuous and binary 
(indicator) variables. For example, GDI growth rate (the dependent 
variable), level of democracy, regime durability, level of GDI per capita, 
population growth rate, and empire are continuous variables.  The roles of 
democracy and empire have already been examined. GDI per capita and 
population growth rate are included as explanatory variables based 
directly on the neoclassical Solow model. We also include a regime 
durability variable from PolityIV database which measures the number of 
years that a given regime has been unchanged. 
27 We expect this variable 
to be negatively related to growth both in democracies where, based on 
Olson (1982) and Weede (1997), we expect that the power of entrenched 
interest groups would increase with the length of time a  regime has been 
in power, and in dictatorships where we expect, based mostly on the 
African experience (van de Walle 2005), that the regimes grow more 
predatory in time. 
28 
                                                 
27 More exactly, it is defined as “the number of years since the last substantive change in 
authority  characteristics”  (see  Marshall  and  Jaggers,  2004,  p.  1 6 ) .  T h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  
change is defined as at least a three-point change in the polity2 score. 
 
28 Least educated countries tend to have longest-serving leaders (see Glaeser, La Porta 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004,  p. 286). “ Serving”  is only a manner of speaking. 
  30 
 
We include several time- and country-variant indicator  variables. 
They are political status of the country (independent, colony), basic 
political system (Communist or not), and involvement in civil or inter-state 
wars. 
29 These variables vary across years and countries but can take 
only two values (0 and 1).  
 
The second group of variables includes those that stand for what 
may be called Zeitgeist, the spirit of the times or time-idiosyncratic 
variables. They are world average level of protection, and world average 
level of democracy. They reflect how protectionist and democratic the 
world is at any given point in time—a fact which might affect countries’ 
growth rates by facilitating exchanges whether by trade or transfer of 
technology or through copying of (better) social forms of organization. We 
would expect that a more open world in these two important aspects 
(trade and democracy) would exert a positive impact on growth in 
individual countries—whatever the economic policy or democracy stance 
of the countries themselves.  
 
                                                 
29 The war variable for COW has not, to the best of my knowledge, been used in growth 
regressions. Other similar variables, like frequency of coups and revolutions, have. Barro 
(1991) finds that coups and revolutions are negatively correlated with growth. Levine and 
Renelt (1992) do not find direct correlation between revolutions and coups, and growth 
but argue that “ wars”   influence growth (negatively) through reduction in 
investment/GDI ratio. Whatever the case, there is little doubt that wars are, on balance, 
negatively correlated with economic growth. Here, a war year is defined as a year of 
inter- or intra-state war as coded by the Correlates of War database and provided that 
the number of casualties is greater than 1000. The latter is a conventional cut-off point: 
we introduce it to disregard relatively small conflicts that are unlikely to have much of an 
impact on economic life. 
  31 
The third type of variables are country-specific. We allow for them 
by using a fixed-effect (or Least Squre Dummy Variable) formulation of 
equation (1). Country-specific variables are supposed to be some 
unobservable characteristics that define a country and that do not vary in 
time. Over such a long period of two  centuries, and with changes in 
countries’ borders, such characteristics are not as likely to be time-
invariant as in the usual panel analysis. Nevertheless, there are, arguably, 
certain characteristics that are country-specific and that might have 
“survived” over two centuries: they are features such as language, 
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where yit = GDI per capita of country i at time (year) t, X’ s time- and 
country-variant variables, Z’ s  time-variant variables, Di = country 
dummy, ln Vit = ln (nit+g+δ ) where nit= population growth rate, g=rate of 
labor augmenting technological progress and δ =depreciation rate (all 
derived from the textbook Solow model of economic growth) and ε it = 
county- and time-dependent error term.
 30 
 
Results. We shall throughout use a fixed effect regressions without 
instruments since we lack a suitable long-term instrument for democracy 
(or for that matter for any other, potentially endogenous, regressor). 
31 
However, in order to account for the possible reverse causality from 
                                                 
30 The sum of g and δ  is assumed to be 0.03 (3 percent). 
 
31 The instrument for democracy should also ideally be time-varying. Short of lagged 
values for democracy it is difficult to see any such instruments for the period 1820-2000.   32 
growth to democracy and for the fact that the effect of regressors on 
growth may not be immediate (or may not take place within a year which 
is the unit of analysis here), we shall also run equation such as (1) for 
five-year non-overlapping period averages (see results in Annex 2).   33 
Table 1. Regression results, per capita growth 1820-2000 
(country fixed effects) 
  I II  III  IV  V 
Depend. var.  ROGit if 
indep=1 




Initial GDI per capita -0.013  -0.008  -0.009  -0.009  -0.010 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
ln(nit+δ +λ )  -0.013  -0.014  0.001  0.0001  -0.0003 
  (0.001)  (0)  (0.985)  (0.987)  (0.957) 
Polity2  -0.003         
  (0.018)         
Ln (GDI per capita)* 0.0004         
Polity2   (0.007)         
Polity2_world mean  -0.001  -0.001       
  (0.063)  (0.121)       
Regime durability  0.000005         
  (0.914)         
War (0-1)  -0.030  -0.030  -0.042  -0.042  -0.042 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Communist (0-1)  0.024  0.020  0.015  0.015  0.015 
  (0)  (0)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.025) 
World average   -0.001  -0.001       
tariff rate 1/  (0)  (0)       
  -0.004  0.012  0.011    Independence (0- 1)
  (0.084)  (0)  (0.001)   
Empire    -0.00003  -0.00002  -0.00002  -0.00002 
    (0.325)  (0.678)  (0.680)  (0.671) 
Colonial wars        -0.005  -0.012 
        (0.587)  (0.211) 
English colony          -0.006 
          (0.241) 
French colony          0.008 
          (0.244) 
Portuguese colony          -0.003 
          (0.805) 
Spanish colony          -0.021 
          (0.411) 
Germany colony          -0.128 
         (0) 
US colony          -0.018 
          (0.338) 
Dutch colony          -0.027 
          (0.105) 
Japanese colony          -0.068  34 
         (0) 
Belgian colony          0.002 
          (0.923) 
Italian colony          -0.050 
          (0.056) 
South African          0.00008 
colony          (0.998) 
0.086  0.048  0.061  0.061  0.078  Constant 
  (0)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0) 
No of obs.  7529  9027  9583  9583  9455 
R-squared  0.0252  0.0230  0.0175  0.0175  0.0238 











Note: p-values between parenthesis. ROGit=rate of annual GDI per capita growth. ROGwt= 
rate of growth of world GDI per capita. Coefficients significant at less than 5 percent 
level are shaded.  
1/ Communist countries not included.  35 
 
Regression I (Table 1) shows our first formulation. It does not 
include colonialism and is run across independent country/years only. The 
results show conditional income convergence (in the sense that a given 
country grows slower when its GDI per capita is higher). Own democracy 
is associated with slower growth. However there is some non-linearity as 
the coefficient on the interaction term between  income and  democracy is 
positive. As income per capita grows the interaction term at first partially 
offsets and then overturns the negative coefficient on the polity2 variable.  
Moreover, the turning point occurs at a relatively low income just above 
$PPP1,000 
32 or income level of Ghana and Zimbabwe in the year 2000. 
Thus for all intents and purposes, democracy seem to be associated with a 
positive effect on growth which moreover increases in income.  For 
example, at the GDI per capita of about $5,000 and polity2 value of 7, the 
gain from one point increase in democracy is 0.4 percent per capita per 
annum; at GDI per capita of $15,000 and democracy score of 7, the gain is 
0.6 percent. 
33 The positive effect of democracy is even more visible if we 
look at the data “sliced” into five-year non-overlapping intervals. In such 
a formulation, democracy is given more time to affect growth.  There the 
effect of growth is positive throughout (i.e. regardless of income level) 
and amounts to 0.1 percent per capita per annum (see Annex 2). 
 
The average level of democracy in the world, on the contrary, has 
no statistically significant effect on growth, nor does, pace Olson, own 
regime durability. War, not unexpectedly, has both a statistically 
                                                 
32 All values are in 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars. 
 
33 The gain, of course, increases with higher values of both income and democracy but 
the income turning point is, whatever the polity2 value, the same.  36 
significant and economically meaningful negative impact. Each year of 
involvement in civil or international wars lowers GDI per capita by some 3 
percentage points. Communist years have had a positive effect on growth 
amounting to about 2.4 percentage points (compared to the alternative of 
not being Communist and everything else being the same). Higher global 
level of protectionism is negatively associated with growth: a 1 percent 
increase in world average tariff rate  is associated with growth rate 
reduction of 1/10 of one percent.  
 
The Bairoch hypothesis examined. In Regression II, we introduce a 
time- and country-varying indicator for being a colony as well as the 
empire variable. Here however we face the following problem. Normally, 
when a country is colony its polity2 score is missing. A few cases where it 
is not (see Table 1 in Annex 1) are  exceptional and thus of limited  
importance. 
34 Therefore, if we introduce an indicator variable for being a 
colony, we have to drop the democracy variable.  This is done in 
Regression II. The results for all the “old” variables are as before, and 
neither of the two “new” variables, independence and empire, is 
significant. 
 
In Regression III, we redefine somewhat our approach. The lack of 
the effect of colonialism may have been due to the changed nature of 
technological progress—a variable which is in the background of our 
analysis. We thus ask whether growth of a given country when it was a 
colony and when it became independent was the same—not in absolute 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
34 There are only 45 observations where polity2 variable is available when countries are 
colonies vs. more than 1,400 missing (see Table 3 in Annex 1).   37 
terms any more but compared to the average world growth. 
35 The mean-
normalization through the use of world average growth rate also sweeps 
away idiosyncratic time effects (like, for example, the oil crisis). In other 
words, we look at a country’s relative growth rate and ask: is it growing 
faster than the rest of the world or not, and does its political status 
(colony, independent) matter? 
36 The results show that the conditional 
convergence, negative impact  of wars, and positive impact of communism 
survive in this formulation. Wars become even more detrimental to 
growth. Our main variable of interest, independence is associated with a 
statistically significant relative growth gain of 1.2 percentage points. Since 
the empire variable remains statistically insignificant, we would—based on 
the analysis so far—tend to conclude that the Bairoch hypothesis is 
supported by the facts.   
 
In Regression IV we introduce another effect of colonialism: colonial 
wars (and wars of national independence) which are coded separately by 
Correlates of War project. The significance and magnitude of other 
coefficients remain unchanged while colonial wars  are not statistically 
significant.  
 
In Regression V, we try to see what is really behind the negative 
impact of colonialism on relative growth:  were all colonies (regardless of 
the metropolis) equally affected?  The results show that the positive sign 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
35We drop other global (time-varying) variables such as the average level of democracy 
and world protectionism since their interpretation is no longer clear.  
 
36 The dependent variable is now country’ s growth rate minus world growth rate (all in 
annual and contemporaneous terms). 
  38 
on the independence variable (that is, the negative effect of being a 
colony) is explained by the negative impact on growth exerted by German 
and Japanese occupations. In the former case, the effect is entirely due to 
the Second World War when output in European countries occupied by 
Germany plummeted: if we run the same regression as V while dropping 
the years 1939-45, the effect disappears  (results not shown here). 
37 In 
the case of Japan, however, the negative effect of colonialism is different: 
it is caused by the exceptionally fast post-colonial growth of South Korea 
and Taiwan. Thus at a closer inspection, a “generalized” independence 
dividend dissipates or is shown to stand for the post World War II  
economic success of the East Asian countries. None of the other colonial 
variables in regression V is significant.  
 
The result we obtain is therefore that a country’s relative growth 
rate is unrelated to its being independent or not. The independence 
dividend seems to have been nil, and so was the empire dividend for the 
metropolises. Figure 7  illustrates the lack of the independence dividend 
using the examples of the British and French colonies. It shows the 
distribution of the relative growth rates of the countries that were British 
(in the left panel) and French (in the right panel) colonies when they were 
colonies and when independent. 
38 There is no statistical  difference in the 
distributions, nor in the means and medians (see Table 2).  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
37 These are the only German-occupied countries for which we have both GDI per capita 
and population data so that they can be included in the regressions. The GDI data for 
Tanzania, Togo, Namibia etc. when they were German colonies are not available.  
 
38 These two empires accounted for the bulk of colonies (see Table 2 in Annex 1). The 
results here are based on 1,348 observations (annual growth rates) for twenty-three 
British colonies, and 1,224 growth rates for twenty-four French colonies so the sample 
size or the selection bias are unlikely to have driven the results.    39 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of relative growth rates of countries when 
they were colonies and when independent 
 
British  colonies                                             French colonies 
 
Note: Colonial years=dashed line; independence=solid line.  
Definition: Relative growth rate is a country’s growth rate minus world growth 
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Table 2. Relative growth rates of British and French colonies when 
colonies and when independent 
 
  British  French 
  As colonies  As independent  As colonies  As independent 
Mean   -0.2  -0.8  -0.8  -1.4 















  0.70 
(0.40) 
 
Note: p values between parentheses. Definition: Relative growth rate is a 
country’s growth rate minus world growth rate in the same year, expressed in fractiles, 
e.g. 0.05 is 5%. 
 
Democracy and growth at different income levels. The redefinition of 
growth in relative terms allows us to go back to the issue of the 
relationship between democracy and growth. As we have noticed in 
Regression I, at higher levels of income, democracy has an increasingly 
positive impact on growth. We illustrate this point in Figure 8. The left 
panel shows the distribution of relative growth rates among dictatorships 
and democracies at very low income levels (under $PPP 3,000).
39 The two 
distributions are practically the same (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
easily accepts the equality of distributions). The two medians are also 
practically the same: -0.50 percent for the dictatorships and –0.43 percent 
for democracies.   
 
Consider now the right panel which displays the two distributions of  
relative growth rates  in higher income countries, those above $PPP 
                                                 
39 Dictatorships are defined as observations with a polity2 score less than 0; democracies 
as observations with a polity2 score greater than +5.  41 
8,100. The situation is clearly different here: democracies display much 
less variability in outcomes and also a higher median and mean growth 
rate. The median relative growth rate for the rich democracies (in peace) 
is +0.7 percent, for the rich dictatorships (in peace) -1.0 percent; the 
means are respectively +0.6 percent and -1.4 percent. 
40  
 
Figure 8. Distributions of relative growth rates of dictatorships and 
democracies in poor and rich countries 
Poor   countries                                     Rich countries 
 
Note: Solid line=democracy; dashed  line=dictatorship. Dictatorship is defined as 
polity2<0; democracy as polity2>5. Poor countries are defined as those with GDI per 
capita less than $PPP3,000; rich countries as those with GDI per capita greater than 
$PPP8,100. Relative growth rate is a country’s growth rate minus world growth rate in 
the same year, expressed in fractiles, e.g. 0.05 is 5%. All observations are annual. 
 
 
The same result—better performance of democracies than 
dictatorships at high income levels—is confirmed if we run a regression 
such as (1) but which “nets out” all the effects on growth except for 
                                                 
40 It may be thought that the number of observations of dictatorships with high incomes 
would be small or limited to oil-rich countries. This is not the case: we have 123 
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income. The cumulative distribution of the growth rates controlled for all 
the other variables is then plotted in Figure 9 (right panel) for high income 
democracies and dictatorships.
41 More than 70 percent of relative growth 
rates in rich  dictatorships are negative (that is, lower than the world 
average in a given year), while the same percentage for the rich 
democracies is less than 30. But in poor countries (see left panel in Figure 
9), the distribution of relative growth rates between dictatorships and 
democracies is almost identical. 
 
Figure 9. Cumulative distribution of countries’ relative growth rates 
in democracies and dictatorships controlled for all variables but 
income level  
Poor countries                                           Rich countries   
 
Note: Relative growth rate is a country’s growth rate minus world growth rate in 
the same year. It is netted out, using regression such as (1), of all effects except for 
income and expressed in fractiles, e.g. 0.05 is 5%. Dictatorship is defined as polity2<0; 
democracy as polity2>5. Poor countries are defined as those with GDI per capita less 
than $PPP3,000; rich countries as those with GDI per capita greater than $PPP8,100. All 
observations are annual. 
                                                 
41 This is the residual obtained as actual growth rate minus the predicted growth rate 
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Introducing heterogeneous slopes. Dynamic panel regressions such 
as (1) yield inconsistent parameter estimates in fixed effects.  This is 
because the disturbance  term in (1) and the lagged income on the RHS 
are correlated. The problem is particularly severe in small samples. It is 
less severe if time  and cross sectional dimensions are (as here) large and 
if the “true” parameters are homogeneous, i.e. if the true state of the 
world is such that slopes for all the countries are the same.  (This is what 
we implicitly assume when running fixed effect regressions). But if the 
true state of the world is that, while the model is the same for all the 
countries, the slopes are heterogeneous, the inconsistency of the 
estimators does not disappear even when the time and cross sectional 
dimensions tend to infinity. And there are indeed good reasons to believe 
that the slopes may differ between the countries. To allow for slopes’ 








1 , ln ln        for ∀i  (2) 
where φ ji is country i-th specific estimate of the coefficient of the 
variable Xj (for simplicity we denote both the lagged value of y and other 
independent variables as X’ s). Now, the use of (2) means that the same 
regression will be run across each country and county slopes retrieved 
from individual regressions. This is, of course, a feasible strategy only if 
we have a sufficiently long time-series so that there is a meaningful 
number of data points for each country.   
 
Therefore (2) is run across each country with the number of data 
points varying depending primarily on the number of observations of  44 
country’ s growth rate. Some countries like the UK have  continuous data 
for more than 150 years; at the other extreme are Belarus and Albania  
where we have data for only 11 and  12 years.
42 We can retrieve country-
specific  slopes for all  the RHS variables. Here however we are 
interested in the effect of democracy on growth. The results will be 
presented for this variable only.  
 
Consider first the distribution of the coefficients on polity2 variable. 
We have regression results for 133 countries. The mean value of the 
slopes (the mean group estimator, MGE) is +0.11 percent per capita p.a. 
and the standard deviation is 0.48—clearly implying a very wide 
distribution of the outcomes . The hypothesis that the MGE (which is 
distributed normally) is not statistically different from zero cannot be 
rejected. But also, “ assigning”  to each country the same coefficient 
seriously underestimates the diversity of outcomes. A more interesting 
question is then a non-parametric one: what is the distribution of the 
country-specific coefficients on the polity2 variable,  and is the effect of 
democracy on growth in most cases positive or not? In 64 percent of the 
countries, the coefficient on polity2 is positive (Table 3). The result 
becomes even stronger, reaching almost 70 percent of the cases if we 
look at the distribution of the statistically significant (at the 5 percent or 
less) slopes only. 
43  In conclusion, the results obtained using 
heterogeneous coefficients on democracy, suggest that: (1) there is a 
huge variability across countries in the effect of democracy on growth, (2) 
                                                 
42 This is because the regressions are run across independent and non-Communist 
country/years only. We also “ lose”  some countries because polity2  does not vary. 
This is the case of the United States where polity2 is dropped from the regression.  
 
43 A little over one-half of the coefficients are statistically significant (see Table 10).   45 
that in more than 60 percent and possibly up to 70 percent of the cases 
the effect of democracy is positive, and yet (3) if we want to express the 
effect using one number only we cannot reject the hypothesis that it is not 
significantly different from zero   
 
Table 3: Heterogeneous slopes: the effect of polity2 on growth 
when allowed to vary between countries 
  Coefficient on polity2 variable 





Mean  +0.11  +0.18 
St.deviation  +0.48  +0.59 
Median  +0.09  +0.34 
Percentage positive  64  69 
Total number of 
countries 
118  65 
Note: excludes outliers, that is regression coefficients that are greater than 1 in absolute 
value. Fifteen coefficients are dropped.  




We have looked at the record spanning some two hundred years of 
modern growth, democracy, protectionism and political developments 
reflected in the rise of fall of colonialism and then the rise and fall of 
Communism. To do this we have merged three recently-created large 
data bases: Maddison’ s data on world incomes, PolityIV data on 
democracy, and Correlates of War data on wars and political status of the 
countries. The advantage of this uniquely large data base of some 10,000 
observations on countries’  annual growth rates and several variables that 
have previously been found correlated with growth allows us to test 
several important hypotheses.  
 
The first hypothesis deals with the effect of democracy on growth. 
We find the effect to be either positive throughout income spectrum or to 
be slightly non-linear in the sense that democracies outperform 
dictatorships at all income levels but the very lowest. The difference 
between the performance of democracies and dictatorships increases as 
income level goes up. Thus, for example, in rich countries (defined as 
those with GDI per capita above $8,100) and controlled for all other 
relevant own-country variables like war, Communism, population growth, 
and regime durability, more than 70 percent of dictatorships in any one 
year grow slower than the world average, but less than a third of 
democracies do.  
 
We find no evidence however that the average level of democracy 
in the world  has much to do with individual countries’  growth rates. In 
other words, there is no positive externality bestowed by democratization.  47 
Democracy—as far as growth is concerned—does not seem to have any 
“ publicness” : it benefits only countries that are democratic, not their 
dictatorial neighbors.  
 
We find no evidence for either benign on malign effect of 
colonialism on growth rates. The size of the empire is consistently 
insignificant in the regressions: so imperialism does not seem to have 
helped the metropolises raise their growth rate. But similarly we do not 
find any effect of colonialism on the growth rate of colonies.  The growth 
rates of the British and French colonies—which of course account for the 
bulk of all colonies—relative to the rest of the world do not show any 
significant difference between the colonial and post-colonial periods, nor 
between themselves. Unlike some other papers, we find no evidence that 
British colonies did better, either while they were colonies or during 
independence, than the French colonies. We reject all three hypotheses 
regarding the effect of colonialism: Bairoch’ s (negative effect on 
colonies, none on metropolises), Amin’ s (negative on colonies, positive 
on metropolises) and Hobson’ s (negative on both). This, of course, does 
not exclude the possibility that colonialism slowed down the growth rate 
of colonies not only while they were colonies but permanently. The bad 
effects of colonialism thus may linger on. But this is not a hypithesis we 
are exploring in the paper. 
 
Another global political phenomenon was Communism. We find a 
positive effect of Communism on growth (approximately 1.5 percent per 
capita per annum on average). Thus we find it difficult to argue that the 
fall of Communism was caused by its economic inefficiency. 
  48 
Not surprisingly, we find the effect of civil conflicts and wars  to 
have been statistically significant and economically meaningfully negative, 
implying a loss of GDI per capita of between 3 and 4 percent for each year 
of  serious conflict (defined conventionally as the conflicts with the 
number of casualties above 1,000 per year). There is very little doubt that 
the negative effect of war is significant and, to use a pun of perhaps 
dubious taste, that it will “ survive”  in any similar regressions.  
 
Unlike democracy which does not seem to generate externalities, 
protectionism, it appears, does. Higher level of world average tariff rate is 
robustly and negatively associated with individual countries’  growth—
whether the countries themselves are projectionist or not. There is thus 
some evidence for the benign effects of generally lower tariff rates.   49 
Annex 1. Data issues 
 
Merging PolityIV and Maddison GDI databases 
PolityIV data base provides information on political variables (levels 
of democracy, autocracy etc.) for all independent entities from 1800 to 
2002. An independent entity is defined as a unit that is a member of the 
inter-state system (such as League of Nations or United Nations) or is 
recognized as an independent entity by at least two major powers. The 
approach is historical in the sense that political variables are assessed for 
any given entity within its contemporaneous borders. Thus for example, 
for the period before 1860, there are data for different units which later 
composed Italy: Papal States, the Two Sicilies, Parma, Sardinia and so 
forth. It is only after 1860 that the data for Italy exist. Similarly, for 
example, the data for Estonia are given for the period when Estonia 
existed as an independent entity: between 1919 and 1940 and then again 
after 1991. The data on India begin in 1950 etc. The PolityIV approach is 
therefore very clear but is not fully compatible with the approach followed 
by Maddison when he created his database of historical GDIs per capita 
and population. 
 
Maddison’s approach is to take the currently (around year 2000) 
existing countries as the unit of analysis and try to trace the level of 
income and population over the territory they currently (in 2004) occupy. 
As can be quickly seen, the PolityIV and Maddison approach are very 
different when country borders change. Maddison estimates GDI per 
capita over the territory of current Italy in (say) 1820, while PolityIV data 
provides information on democracy in different (Italian) units none of 
which is equal to today’s Italy and which may have had various levels of  50 
democracy. For example, polity2 scores for the constituent parts of the 
future Italy cover the range from -10 for the Kingdom of two Sicilies, 
Modena, Parma and Tuscany, -9 for Papal States to -7 for Sardinia. 
Similar examples abound. For 1820, Maddison provides separate estimates 
of GDI per capita for Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia although they 
were then the same country. Moreover, Maddison’s approach is not fully 
consistent as this example illustrates. If always only current states were 
considered, then the data should have been provided for the Czech 
republic and Slovakia separately.  Maddison similarly provides estimates 
for the territory of the USSR (and implicitly of the Czarist Russia
44) going 
back to 1500 but the data for Russia (within its current borders) are given 
only for the period after 1991.  
 
The task was then to adapt the PolityIV data to those produced by 
Maddison. This approach, rather than reverse, was chosen because GDI 
per capita data are key for our research and because PolityIV data are 
more detailed (broader in terms of coverage). Hence the task was to 
“squeeze” as much information from PolityIV to fit the Maddison 
requirements. To do this we have followed the three rules. 
 
The dominant country rule. When a country goes through the 
unification-division-unification (UDU) or through divided-unified (DU) 
processes, the data for the “dominant” country—defined in terms of 
population and GDI, e.g. West Germany vs. East Germany, or South Korea 
vs. North Korea—are used. This implies that South Korea is considered as 
a successor to the unified Korea: the PolityIV data from 1800 up to 1905 
                                                 
44 Although of course the two territories were not the same.  51 
(when Korea was annexed by Japan) and which pertain to the entire 
territory of the peninsula are “continued” with the data on South Korea 
only. 
45 Similarly, Maddison income data that pertain to the territory of the 
present-day Germany are paired with PolityIV democracy data that refer 
first to Prussia from 1820 to 1868, then with those on Germany as it 
existed from 1868 to 1945, then with PolityIV data for West Germany 
only, and since 1991 with the data for the current Federal Republic of 
Germany. The data series for both democracy and income are thus 
uninterrupted for Germany since 1850 but the territory for which PolityIV 
data strictly speaking refer does not always coincide with the territory 
which is covered by Maddison’s income estimates. 
 
Territorial rule. When the territory does not change significantly (as 
for example between Czarist Russia and the USSR), the PolityIV data 
which refer respectively to Russia (1800-1917) and the USSR (1917-
1991) are applied to Maddison’s GDI per capita estimates for the territory 
of the former USSR. Concretely, it means that the democracy score for 
Russia in (say, 1910) that strictly speaking applies also to the territories 
of today’s eastern Poland and Finland (which were parts of the then 
Empire) are combined with income data that cover only the territory of the 
USSR (that is, exclude parts of today’s Poland and Finland). Even more 
complicated is the case of the former Yugoslavia. Maddison provides data 
for the territory of the former Yugoslavia going back to 1870. But over 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
45 There is an ironic twist in the Korean data. Maddison’ s uninterrupted income series 
for Korea begins in 1911 a few years after the country was annexed by Japan and as 
PolityIV series is interrupted. Thus both income and democracy data are available only 
for the years after 1948 and at two data points in the 19
th century.  
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this territory, only Serbia was an independent state and as such is 
included in PolityIV database. Thus, Serbia’s Polity scores for the period 
1830-1914 are applied to a per capita income that, in principle at least, 
covers a wider space. During the period 1918-1991 when Yugoslavia 
existed,  Polity  and Maddison coverage coincide. They are also 
consistent after the Yugoslav break-up in 1991 since both democracy and 
income data refer to the five successor states.  
 
No dominant country. When two or several countries go through the 
UDU or DU process, and there is no obviously dominant country, the only 
data we use are those that refer to the unified country. Thus, for example, 
Maddison’s data on unified Vietnam’s income (within current borders)  
cannot be meaningfully paired with either South Vietnamese or North 
Vietnamese democracy scores between 1955 and 1975. (These scores, by 
the way, are quite different: South Vietnamese are –3, North Vietnamese 
range from –9 to –7). The situation is the same with countries that were 
unified to form Italy in 1861 or with North and South Yemen, unified in 
1990. As a result, for Vietnam we use income and political data for the 
years after 1976 only, for Yemen for the years after 1990 only, and for 
Italy for the years after 1861 only. This entails almost no loss of 
information regarding Italy since Maddison gives GDI per capita for only 
two years prior to 1861; such a loss however exists for Maddison’s 
income data for Vietnam and Yemen that are continuously available from 
1950 onwards but which cannot be “paired” with any PolityIV scores on 
democracy. The main reason for this “informational loss” is non-
uniformity of democratic experiences among countries which later  53 
combine into a single whole
46 and which, prior to unification, are of 
broadly equal (GDI or population) size. This in turn means that  none of 
them can meaningfully impart its democracy scores to the whole, that is, 
be paired with income data that refer to the whole country. 
 
Finally, countries whose population is less than 500,000 and for 
which PolityIV does not provide data are not included in the regressions 
even if Maddison’s GDI per capita data are available. They are Cape 
Verde (population in 2000, 400,000), Sao Tome and Principe (160,000), 
Seychelles (80,000). 
 
Independence (colony) and empire variables 
Independence variable  takes values 0 and 1. For all countries that 
are members of the inter-state system as defined by the Correlates of 
War project  independence is coded 1 (of course, only for the years when 
they are members of the inter-state system because  countries do enter 
and exit the inter-state system). For countries that are not members, 
independence variable takes value of 0. However, among the latter, we 
have made three exceptions.  
 
First, countries that have been independent prior to joining the 
inter-state system are considered independent throughout. This applies 
(as mentioned in the main text) to countries such as Japan, China, 
Thailand, and Iran that joined the  inter-state system relatively late (1860 
                                                 
46 Obviously if the countries had the same democracy scores the problem would not 
arise: either country could be “ paired”  with income data that refer to the whole unified 
country.   54 
for Japan and China, 1855 for Iran, and 1887 for Thailand) although they 
were independent throughout the 19
th century. The same rule applies to a 
number of other countries. Here are few examples. Liberia was 
independent although not in the nation-state system (enters it in 1920);   
Ethiopia (independent throughout the 19
th century but enters the system in 
1898), Madagascar (independent in the 1800’s prior to the French 
conquest but enters the system in 1950 only) Afghanistan (enters the 
nation state-system 1920 but independent before), Nepal (1920), Oman 
(1971). Similarly, a number of Latin American counties are coded as 
independent from the year of their actual independence, achieved 
generally in the early 1820s, rather than from the year when they joined 
the inter-state system (Argentina  in 1841, Chile in 1839). Korea  enters 
the inter-state system in 1948 but is treated as independent before 
Japanese conquest in 1905. 
47 
Second, for the Commonwealth’s self-governing territories which, 
although without formal independence (Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand, South Africa  until 1920) we code independence variable as 1. 
The same applies to Finland (part of Russia between 1809 and 1917) 
because of its social and economic autonomy and also Norway (part of 
Sweden up to 1905) which anyway has polity2 scores separate from 
Sweden. 
48   
                                                 
47 F o r  t h e  c o d i n g  o f  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r  o f  c o l o n i a l  o c c u p a t i o n  i n  A f r ica  we  also  used  
Wesseling (1996, Appendices 1 and 2). 
 
48 Separate polity2 scores start only with independence for Finland, and in 1901  for 
Australia and 1910 for South Africa. New Zealand and Canada are rated since the mid-
1800s.  
  55 
The third  exception applies to the countries that were (i) broadly 
equal partners, and (ii) had largely economic policy-making autonomy in 
an union that was later dissolved.  They too are assumed to have been 
independent during the entire period of the union.  Thus, both Austria and 
Hungary are considered as independent throughout the whole period (but 
not Czechoslovakia or Slovenia, for example).  Also Syria is considered 
the same as Egypt during the two years (1959-60) of the United Arab 
Republic, and Bangladesh (1950-1972) is considered as an equal partner 
in the union with Pakistan.    
 
  We thus have the following situation: 
(1) When a country is a member of the inter-state system as coded 
by Correlates of War project, it is coded as independent =1. 
(2) Countries that are not members of the inter-state system and do 
not fall under the three exceptions listed above are treated as 
independent = 0. 
(3) If a country is listed as independent = 0, then it must be a 
colony, that is, it must be “allocated” to a metropolis (empire).   
This is always true except in a few cases listed below where a 
non-independent country is not allocated to a colonial power. 
 
These  exceptions are seven. They are Ireland (1820-1920), Puerto 
Rico (in the Maddison’s data base since 1951), Palestine  (1850-2000), 
Austria (1938-1944), Czechoslovakia and Poland (both before 1918) and 
Belgium (before 1830).  They are neither considered colonies nor 
independent countries. What is special in all these cases is that the 
countries although not independent (in the sense of being  self-governing) 
and not equal partners in the unions were either incorporated into the  56 
larger wholes (e.g. Austria), given distinct administrative status (like 
Puerto Rico) and were thus not treated as colonies. To see that, compare 
the position of Austria (an integral part of Gross Deutschland) with the 
Netherlands also occupied by Germany during World War II;  or Belgium 
(before 1830) with Indonesia, or Ireland with India. 
49 
 
It needs also to be mentioned that Germany, Japan and Austria are  
considered as independent even during the Allied occupation after World 
War II; but not so European and Asian countries conquered by Germany 
and Japan between 1939 and 1945. 
50 This is because in terms of freedom 
to conduct domestic economic policies, the two occupations were quite 
different. For the same reason Hong Kong after 1997 (reincorporation into 
China) is treated as independent.  
 
Finally, note the relationship between the independence, colony and 
polity2 variables. Obviously if independence = 1, polity2 variable must be 
available (unless the country is in transition, civil or international war). 
When independence = 0 and country is a colony  then we expect that 
polity2 will be missing (there is no national polity). However, there are 
certain countries and years (listed in Table 1) where polity2 data are 
available while the countries are scored as independent=0 and are treated 
as colonies. These were typically the transition periods  during which 
                                                 
49 None of these countries is coded by Polity during the years of its non-independence.  
 
50 The exception is France which through Etat Francais, although under the German 
tutelage, continued its existence as a country. Likewise China, despite being in part 
conquered by Japan, is considered independent throughout.  In both cases, there was a 
functioning national government even if the territory over which it ruled was smaller than 
before. 
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countries were not officially independent but have gained a measure of 
self-governance.  
 
Table 1. Self-governing territories without formal independence but with 
separate Polity codings 
Country  Number of years  Period  Colony of: 
Dominican Republic  17  1844-60  Spain 
Egypt  15  1922-36  UK 
Haiti  16  1918-33  US 
Indonesia  4  1945-48  Netherlands 
Iraq  8  1924-31  UK 
Jamaica  3  1959-61  UK 
Lebanon  3  1943-45  France 
Libya  1  1951  Italy 
Morocco  1  1912  France 
Peru  3  1821-23  Spain 
Philippines  8  1935-45  US/Japan 
Rwanda  1  1961  Belgium 
South Korea  5  1906-10  Japan 
Sudan  2  1954-55  UK 
Syria  2  1944-45  France 
 
 
Empires. There are 13 empires listed in Table 2 with the number of 
countries/years under their rule and average colonial population under 
their  “ control”  between 1850 and 1950. 
51 
 
Table 3 summarizes the merger results of the three large data 
bases: Madison’ s with its GDI and population numbers, PolityIV with its 
democracy scores, and Correlates of War with its country status data. In 
the regressions, where we need country/years with all four types of 
observations we can use  shaded cells which yield almost 8,900 data 
points. Our  “ real” loss due to the unavailable GDI data is composed of 
cells (1,4),  (1,5) and (1,6), that is of  slightly less than 1,300 data points. 
                                                 
51 Russia  is not included among the colonial powers because the Asian territories it 
conquered were never legally colonies.  58 
 
Table 2. Size of empires 






















Great Britain  1,552  346  40  865 
France  986  49  40  123 
Portugal  126  6  6  100 
Spain  216  5  20  25 
Germany  61  2  53  4 
United States  116  6  81  7 
Ottoman Empire  594  6  17  35 
Netherlands  128  42  6  700 
Japan  148  12  49  24 
China  91  0.4  43  1 
Belgium  34  10  7  143 
Italy  84  2  34  6 
South Africa  75  0.4  7  6 
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Annex 2.  Results of regression (1) run over averages for non-overlapping 
five-year intervals, 1870-2000 
 
I  II  III  IV  V 
Depend. var. ROGit if 
indep=1 




Initial GDI per   -0.013  -0.021  -0.014  -0.014  -0.014 
capita  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
ln(nit+δ +λ )  -0.030  -0.034  0.005  0.005  -0.007 
  (0)  (0)  (0.299)  (0.322)  (0.206) 
Polity2  0.001         
  (0.018)         
Ln (GDI per 
capita)* Polity2  -0.00008         
  (0.116)         
Polity2_world   -0.002  -0.001       
mean  (0.002)  (0.022)       
Regime durability  0.000001         
  (0.989)         
War   -0.027  -0.029  -0.034  -0.034  -0.035 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Communist   0.018  0.017  0.003  0.003  0.011 
  (0.01)  (0.025)  (0.716)  (0.731)  (0.197) 
World average   -0.001  -0.002       
tariff rate 1/  (0)  (0)       
  0.010  0.010  0.009    Independence  
  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.022)   
Empire    -0.00003  -0.0001  -0.00005  -0.0001 
    (0.439)  (0.259)  (0.263)  (0.252) 
Colonial wars        -0.016  -0.024 
        (0.219)  (0.057) 
English colony          -0.011 
          (0.069) 
French colony          0.0008 
          (0.926) 
Portuguese 
colony          0.024 
          (0.053) 
Spanish colony          -0.028 
          (0.361) 
US colony          -0.008 
          (0.707)  61 
Dutch colony          -0.020 
          (0.288) 
Japanese colony          -0.084 
        (0) 
Belgian colony          0.008 
          (0.714) 
Italian colony          0.002 
        ( 0 . 9 7 )  
South African          0.003 
colony          (0.911) 
0.041  0.084  0.115  0.115  0.090  Constant 
  (0.048)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
No of obs.  1652  1949  1929  1929  1903 
R-squared  0.0867  0.1108  0.0488  0.0497  0.0677 
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Say why adding continrents does not make sense: econmetrically, 
identification unclear; substantive, unclear what it represenmts (Jordan vs. 
Japan, Lybia vs. South Africa) 
For example, the influential paper by Renelt and Levine that looked at robustness of 
growth regressions seldom has more 100 observations in any one regressions. The 
number of observations ranges between 60 and 70. Peerotti (1996) who similarlrly wrote 
a much-quoted paper on the relationsghip between democracy, growth and institutions, 
unabashedlty empirical anmd whith thje subtiotle “What the data say” never uses more 
than 67 observations (county averages). The entire recent literature on institutions and 
growth (both in the affirmative and in the negative way) is based on between 50-60 data 
points per regression 
 
Add a graph of growth rates if polity2=10 fct of income  and controlled for all other 
variables   66 
 
Comments at Syracuse 
 
Add aslso analysis of exit from democracy incomes 
 
Transitional states: 3 categories (entry incomes., exit incomes, those that go back and 
forth). 
 
Do the same thing as I have done in the paper with non-paarametric analysis but with +1 
or +3 increases in democracy index (jumpin democracy rathger than level of democracy 
onluy). That is, look at the distribution of changes and no of levels. 
 
Give a list of country/years for Polity2>8 entry incomes. {Pethaps their number is small 
and the sensity curves are irrelevant (since bance on a small sample size). 
 
What is key focus of the paper?  
 
Make more clear that the effet of Communism is after afjusting for the effect of 
democeacy level. 
 
Epstein-Bates binary variable (which one? Democracy?) 
 
Period effect of democracy: is democracy in 1850 the same as in 1950? Check the US 
democracy index for before 1865. 
 
Is Polity2 treally executive constraint variable? I don’t think so: there is an exdecutivdde 
clknstraint + this is Wacziarg’s varibale. 
 
The paper rejects dyotic view of democracy vs. non-fdemocracy: emphasize this point 
more 
 
Emphasize that the monotonic relatikonship in the case of rejectioon of P’;s hypothiesis 
is important (not a fluke). 
 
What to do with exit incomes? Przeworsakiu emphasizes that too. 
 
Should I tst both {Przewoprtski and lipste hypitjhesis. Curentl;y I am tesying Przeworski 
onky. But both Hypitheses could be wreomg., 
 
An intreprewation of the lack of effect of coloinialism is that bad coplonial effects do not 
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